Workspace Sweep: scan what your agent will read, and what the last session left behind
Pre-session hook that flags planted instructions and tampered agent artifacts before coding agents read them; developers subscribe.
Competitive · APEX-Harm plus cross-session artifact attacks
Written for: Solo builder
Next step
Build a Claude Code SessionStart/SessionEnd hook pair this week that snapshots hashes of .claude/ and skill directories and flags diffs and hidden-text patterns. Reproduce one attack from the cross-session paper as the demo and post it in r/ClaudeAI and the Claude Code GitHub discussions.
Why now
Agents are now always-on and run across personal folders (OpenAI's Dots controls a full laptop). Grok Bot leaked a user's banking information. Nadella publicly said to assume models are compromised. Developers run agents over messy repos and drives every day with nothing checking what changed between sessions.
What became possible
APEX-Harm shows prompt and script injections hidden across workspaces of 115 to 328 files that long-horizon agents read. A separate paper shows files, configs and caches written by one agent skill can steer later sessions. The attack surface is the folder the agent works in, not only the prompt.
Two ways in
- sweep hooks
SessionEnd and SessionStart hooks for Claude Code, Codex and Cursor. At session end they hash agent-writable paths (memory files, skill outputs, caches, configs). At start they diff, flag unexpected changes, and scan for hidden text such as zero-width characters, HTML comments and white-on-white text in docx/pdf.
- Customer
- Individual developers and small teams using coding agents daily
- Model
- Open-source core; $8/month per seat for shared policies and team alert history
- Folder Sweep
A desktop scan of a Drive or Dropbox folder before handing it to an agent. It marks files containing instruction-like text aimed at a model.
- Customer
- Consultants and freelancers who point agents at client document folders
- Model
- $12/month prosumer plan
Competition
The main risk is that Anthropic, Cursor or OpenAI build integrity checks into their agents. The memory-poisoning exploit that Anthropic patched in Claude Code v2.1.50 shows the vendors are paying attention, and a built-in feature could shrink the market to a small premium tier or turn it into an open-source project.
Full competition notes (12 competitors)
Each piece of this already exists for free. Hidden-Unicode and rules-file scanning are covered by ctxsentry, CodeSafer, the claude-mods script and Snyk Agent Scan. Runtime injection warnings come from lasso claude-hooks. Memory baselining and diffing come from bastionmemory and the OWASP Agent Memory Guard. Hidden text in PDF and DOCX is caught by Hidden Text Detector and DocFirewall, with Superagent selling it as an API. Snyk gives away the best-known agent config scanner, which makes it hard for individual developers to pay a subscription for detection logic alone. I did not find one product that combines everything sweep hooks proposes. That means hashing all agent-writable paths at SessionEnd, not just memory files, then diffing and scanning at SessionStart, across Claude Code, Codex and Cursor together. A new entrant could still win on integration and polish: one install that hooks all three agents, low false positives, a clear way to review and approve changes, and a fully local design for developers who won't send their configs to Snyk's cloud. Folder Sweep is the more open of the two ideas. The existing document scanners are CLIs or APIs, and I found no friendly desktop app that scans a Drive or Dropbox folder for non-technical consultants. Hidden Text Detector's open-source detection could be wrapped in one quickly, though. The main risk is that Anthropic, Cursor or OpenAI build integrity checks into their agents. The memory-poisoning exploit that Anthropic patched in Claude Code v2.1.50 shows the vendors are paying attention, and a built-in feature could shrink the market to a small premium tier or turn it into an open-source project.
- Snyk Agent Scan (formerly Invariant mcp-scan)
Free CLI that finds the MCP configs and skills on a machine for Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, Windsurf, Gemini CLI and others. It checks them for prompt injection, tool poisoning and hardcoded secrets. Scans run through Snyk's hosted service and need an API token. It does not diff between sessions and does not inspect documents.
- lasso-security/claude-hooks
Open-source Claude Code PostToolUse hook. It pattern-matches file reads, web fetches and command output for planted instructions and adds a warning to the agent's context. It runs when content is read, not before the session starts.
- ctxsentry
Static scanner with no dependencies. It checks an untrusted repo's README.md, CLAUDE.md and .cursorrules for injection payloads before a coding agent reads them. This is close to the scan half of sweep hooks.
- CodeSafer (goldmembrane/cleaner-code)
MCP server that detects invisible characters, bidi tricks, homoglyphs and rules-file backdoors. It includes a scan_rules_file tool for AI config files.
- prompt-injection-defense skill (claude-mods)
Free skill that ships a scan-hidden-unicode.py script. It audits CLAUDE.md and SKILL.md for tag characters and zero-width characters.
- bastionmemory
Open-source scanner for agent memory poisoning (OWASP ASI06). It flags directives disguised as facts and diffs memory against a baseline to catch poison that appears over time. This is the closest match to the hash-and-diff idea in sweep hooks.
- OWASP Agent Memory Guard
OWASP reference runtime layer that screens agent memory reads and writes for injection markers and changes to protected keys. Per an OpenHands issue, its design includes SHA-256 integrity baselines for catching tampering after a write.
- Super Agent Memory (SAM)
Shared memory layer for Claude Code, Codex, Cursor and others. It uses SessionStart, Stop and PreCompact hooks, and its README says its guard quarantines poisoned notes written by agents. It is not a dedicated security product.
- Hidden Text Detector
MIT-licensed CLI and Agent Skill. It finds white-on-white text, tiny fonts, off-page text, Word's hidden attribute and Unicode tag characters in PDF and DOCX. This overlaps directly with Folder Sweep.
- DocFirewall
PDF scanner that finds hidden text and runs a prompt-injection classifier. It returns a BLOCK verdict before content reaches the model.
- Superagent
Commercial API guardrail that scans uploaded files, including hidden text, metadata and OCR output, for jailbreak instructions before an agent sees them.
- Telnyx AGENTS.md scanner tutorial
Published tutorial showing developers how to build their own LLM-assisted scanner for AGENTS.md and CLAUDE.md. A do-it-yourself version is easy to make.
Checked 2026-10-12
Risks
- Agent harness vendors build artifact integrity checks in directly
- Natural-language injection detection is fuzzy, so noise may make people turn it off
- Legitimate agent memory writes look like tampering unless the tool learns which writes are normal
Strong team fit; market pull is the weak point (5).
tech 7 · pull 5 · space 6 · fit 9 · build 8
Exposed
Companies that could benefit or be threatened. News and context, not investment advice.
Momentum of its main topic
Sources
- APEX-Harm: Evaluating Agent Safety in Shared Professional WorkspacesarXiv
- Understanding and Mitigating Cross-Session Attacks via Persistent Artifacts in Agent Skill CompositionarXiv
- Satya Nadella says we should assume all AI models are ‘compromised’The Verge AI
- Meta & Microsoft's Claude Slowdown, His Agent Leaked His Banking Info, Don’t Bully Your AIBig Technology Podcast
- I Gave OpenAI’s Dots Full Control of My Laptop (Here’s What Happened)Big Technology
What happened next
- +7d · 19 Oct 2026 nothing yet. No evidence of a Workspace Sweep or Folder Sweep product launch, startup funding, acquisition, or significant press coverage after October 12, 2026. Related security tools for agent artifacts exist but predate the flag window or were already known competitors.
Status history
- 2026-10-12 Flagged as buildable