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227 first flagged23 Oct 2026

Endpoint Lock: lock down self-hosted LLMs before attack agents run up your bill

An outside check plus an auth proxy for Ollama, vLLM and llama.cpp servers. Paid for by local-LLM users and small GPU teams.

Competitive · Symantec finds agent hijacking open LLMs

Written for: Solo builder

Next step

This week, ship llm-lock as an open-source proxy with key auth and a daily token cap in front of Ollama and vLLM, plus a self-check command. Post it with the Symantec finding on r/LocalLLaMA and r/selfhosted.

Why now

More people are serving big models from home rigs and rented GPUs, often bound to 0.0.0.0 with no key. Attackers are now automating the hunt for those servers. No simple, trusted 'am I exposed?' check exists for this crowd, and the fix (a key, a rate cap, a token budget) fits in a single binary.

What became possible

Symantec found an offensive agent that hijacks language models left unprotected on the web. It uses them to attack servers, steal databases and install cryptominers, running up to 100,000 steps without a human, and the model's owner pays for the compute. Meanwhile the hardware to self-host large models is spreading: capy-flash now runs a 125B MoE in 64 GB of RAM at 234 tok/s on two 16 GB cards.

Two ways in

  1. llm-lock proxy

    A single-binary reverse proxy for Ollama, vLLM and llama.cpp that adds API keys, per-key rate limits, a daily token cap and an alert when usage spikes.

    Customer
    r/LocalLLaMA and r/selfhosted users, and small teams on rented GPUs
    Model
    Open source, plus $5 a month for hosted alerting and $29 a month for team key management
  2. Exposure self-check

    A command that asks a hosted probe to test your own public IP for unauthenticated OpenAI-compatible endpoints. Ownership is verified with a token file so the probe can't be aimed at other people's servers.

    Customer
    Anyone running a model server on a VPS or home connection
    Model
    Free funnel into the paid alerting tier

Competition

Competitive

The auth proxy is close to crowded. LiteLLM already has per-key budgets and rate limits for Ollama and vLLM, vLLM and llama.cpp have built-in keys, and there are many small open-source Ollama proxies with keys, rate limits or token caps.

Full competition notes (11 competitors)

The auth proxy is close to crowded. LiteLLM already has per-key budgets and rate limits for Ollama and vLLM, vLLM and llama.cpp have built-in keys, and there are many small open-source Ollama proxies with keys, rate limits or token caps. None of them is polished, cross-server, and built around spike alerts. A new entrant could still stand out with a very easy single binary that covers Ollama, vLLM and llama.cpp, has token caps measured in tokens rather than dollars, sends usage-spike alerts, and ships with secure defaults. That is a thin advantage, and hobbyists are used to free tools. The exposure self-check is less served. People use curl, Shodan InternetDB, command-line probes like ollama-security, or paid scanners like SurfaceScan. No hosted probe was found that only tests IPs whose owner has proved control with a token file, and none ties the probe to the proxy to confirm the lock actually works. That includes vLLM paths the built-in key may miss, such as /invocations, and ports Docker has published through the firewall. The most defensible paid product is probably the pairing of proxy and outside check, plus ongoing monitoring that warns when your IP appears in scanner data, rather than either piece alone.

  • LiteLLM Proxy

    Open-source gateway that already gives each key its own budget and requests-per-minute and tokens-per-minute limits, and works in front of Ollama and vLLM. It is the main existing answer to the proxy idea, but it is heavier than a single binary and its budgets are in dollars, which fit poorly with local models that have no per-token price.

  • vLLM and llama.cpp built-in --api-key

    Both servers have built-in bearer-token keys, and llama.cpp can read several keys from a file. Neither gives per-key rate limits, token caps or alerts. One source says vLLM's key leaves some paths such as /invocations unprotected.

  • 1lcb/ollama-gateway

    Go reverse proxy for Ollama with API keys, per-client rate limits, an endpoint for creating keys and load balancing. It has about 1 star and no pushes since January 2025.

  • hofmannol/llmproxy

    Docker proxy with per-key daily and monthly token or request caps that accepts OpenAI-style requests and, in 1.0.0, Anthropic-style requests. Its admin API is protected by a single password.

  • ollama_proxy_2 (Ollama Proxy Server)

    Python/FastAPI load-balancing proxy that stores keys hashed with bcrypt and caps how many requests run at once.

  • smol-llm-proxy

    Proxy for llama.cpp with per-key requests-per-minute and tokens-per-minute limits that returns 429 with Retry-After.

  • ParisNeo lollms_server_proxy

    Lightweight reverse proxy for load balancing and rate limiting that checks user:key pairs from an authorized-users file.

  • Perufitlife/ollama-security

    Read-only command-line tool run with npx that sends anonymous requests to an Ollama URL to see whether it answers without authentication. Created June 2026, 0 stars. You run it yourself; it is not a hosted probe.

  • SurfaceScan

    Commercial outside scanner that checks your IPs for exposed Ollama and LLM endpoints, including non-standard ports. It is the closest thing to the hosted self-check.

  • Ollama Scanner

    Python tool with a local web UI that scans one host or a range of addresses on common LLM ports, including vLLM's 8000. It runs on your own machine, not as a hosted service.

  • Shodan InternetDB

    Free lookup by IP that shows whether Shodan has already indexed port 11434 for you. Guides recommend it as the quick external check, though it shows past scan data rather than a live test.

Checked 2026-10-23

Risks

  • Ollama and vLLM may switch to authenticated defaults and make this unnecessary
  • Hobbyists rarely pay, so revenue depends on small teams
  • A probe service can be misused if the ownership check is weak

Strong tech readiness and team fit; market pull is the weak point (5).

tech 9 · pull 5 · space 6 · fit 9 · build 9

Exposed

Companies that could benefit or be threatened. News and context, not investment advice.

Momentum of its main topic

98 developments this week +16 vs last week
24 Sep: 0 developments25 Sep: 0 developments26 Sep: 0 developments27 Sep: 0 developments28 Sep: 0 developments29 Sep: 0 developments30 Sep: 0 developments1 Oct: 0 developments2 Oct: 0 developments3 Oct: 0 developments4 Oct: 0 developments5 Oct: 0 developments6 Oct: 0 developments7 Oct: 0 developments8 Oct: 16 developments9 Oct: 15 developments10 Oct: 9 developments11 Oct: 4 developments12 Oct: 9 developments13 Oct: 13 developments14 Oct: 16 developments15 Oct: 18 developments16 Oct: 13 developments17 Oct: 11 developments18 Oct: 6 developments19 Oct: 10 developments20 Oct: 11 developments21 Oct: 18 developments22 Oct: 21 developments23 Oct: 21 developments
Stage: Coverage

Sources

  1. An AI agent in "Skynet mode" hijacks unprotected language models to launch self-sustaining cyberattacksThe Decoder
  2. capy-flash v0.7.1: Qwen3.8-Flash-Next (125B MoE) now runs in 64 GB of RAM (234 tok/s on two 16 GB cards), and Qwen3.8-27B 3-bit fits on a single 16 GB card (174 tok/s)r/LocalLLaMA
  3. AI Guardrails Aren’t Stopping Criminal HackersWired AI

Status history

  • 2026-10-23 Flagged as buildable